In twos tudies we show that people makee nvironments norm-relevant and this increases the likelihood that environments influence norm-relevant judgments. When people see environments without having people on their mind, this effect does not occur.S pecifically,w hen exposed to an environment (a library), people'sp erceived importance of environment-relevant norms (be silent in libraries) increases, when the concept of 'people' is primed comparedt ow hen this is not the case.T he impact on normative judgments of priming significant others (Study 1) is stronger than priming people in general (Study 2). Additional effects on conformism and public selfconsciousness arediscussed, as well as implications for futurestudies.
In twos tudies we show that people makee nvironments norm-relevant and this increases the likelihood that environments influence norm-relevant judgments. When people see environments without having people on their mind, this effect does not occur.S pecifically,w hen exposed to an environment (a library), people'sp erceived importance of environment-relevant norms (be silent in libraries) increases, when the concept of 'people' is primed comparedt ow hen this is not the case.T he impact on normative judgments of priming significant others (Study 1) is stronger than priming people in general (Study 2). Additional effects on conformism and public selfconsciousness arediscussed, as well as implications for futurestudies.
Environments influence people'st houghts, feelings, and actions.Anoisy carnival may elicit happyf eelings, ar un-down cemeteryi sm orel ikely to induce sadness, and a restaurant may bring back memories of exquisited inners just like al ibrarym ay evoke thoughts about world-renown writers. But can an environment also raise the relevance of social norms that apply to that environment? Can ar estaurant spontaneously activatet able manners?C an al ibrarye voke the normt ob es ilent? The main goal of the present researchi st oi nvestigate under what conditions the answer to these questions is 'yes. ' What determines whethera ne nvironment will raise the perceived relevance of social norms that apply (to that environment)? It is unlikely that environments by themselves are typically perceived as strong and clear inducerso fn ormative thoughts and behaviors. Environments are complexa nd multifaceted stimuli that can be perceived in many differentways. Alibrarycan be seen, inter alia,asapile of stones,a place to store books, or ap lace to study and be silent. Which of these interpretations will be most salient is likely to be af unction of ah osto fs ituational and personality variables.Whether or not perceiving alibrarywill spontaneously activatethe normtobe silentthus depends on how one perceives this stimulus, or what interpretational frame one applies whenmaking sense of it (see Lindenberg,2006; Stapel, 2007) .What type of perceiving is likely to induce normative seeing?
We suggest that an environment will be especially likely to be perceived in anormrelevant manner when 'people' areo nt op of perceivers' minds at the time theya re exposed to the environment. When this is the case, perceiversare more likely to encode the environment in social terms, such that it becomesasocial environment; an environment where social norms are relevant. When perceiverslookatalibraryand the construct of 'people' (e.g.peers, parents, students,colleagues)isontop of their mind, relevant norms (be silent) are morel ikely to becomes alient than when' non-people' constructs (e.g. forks, curtains, or trees) occupyt heir thoughts.
We base this hypothesis on previous reasoning by Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2003) . These researcherss howed that the likelihoodi ncreases that an environment activates normative thoughts and behaviors that apply specifically to that environment when this environment is perceived as relevant.A ne nvironment is especially likely to be perceived as relevant, according to Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2003) ,w henp eople are planning to visit it. When people intend to visit an environment, it becomes an environment that calls forn orm-relevant thoughts and norm-guided behavior.T hus, although the normt ob es ilenti nal ibraryp robably is not immediately relevant when one merely sees al ibrary, this norm's relevance increases significantly wheno ne is entering the libraryorisplanning to go in or is thinking about going in. Or,asAarts and Dijksterhuis (2003) showed: people who are instructed to study ap icture of al ibrary and to visit it later in the experiment, soften their voices more than participants who are merely exposed to the pictured library. Aarts and Dijksterhuis's(2003) results suggest that whenpeople have the intention to visit as pecific place, the likelihoodt hat theyw ill see this environment in an ormrelevant manner increases.I nt he present article, we investigate an ew route to increased norm-relevant interpretations.T his new route is subtler because it merely relies on the social interpretation of the environment, rather than on ac onscious intention to actually be there.
The logic behind our claim is simple: We posit that an environment is more likely to be perceived as norm-relevant when it is interpreted in social terms -i ndependent of whethero rn ot one has the intention to go there. Decadeso fk nowledge accessibility research( see e.g. Stapel &S uls,2 007) suggest that such an interpretation is especially likely when 'the social' is cognitivelyaccessible. But differently,especially when'people' are on perceivers' minds,p hysical environments will be seen as social environments wherenorms matter. After all, people and social norms are intrinsically linked with each other as social norms apply to people and regulate interactions between people.
Importantly,p riming any people is unlikely to have the same effect.W et hink it is important to makeadistinction between significant others and people in general (sometimes called 'generalized others'). Previous researchh as shown that significant othersc an be especially powerful elicitorso fn ormative thoughts and behavior.F or example, Ajzena nd Fishbein (1980) have shown repeatedly that the normative expectations of significant othersare strong predictorsofbehavior. For instance, people are less likely to startsmoking when theythink significant otherswill disapprove of this behavior (Ajzen &F ishbein, 1980) . Priming significant others may also be ag ood tool/way to induce norm-relevant interpretations of environments because people primarily learnf rom their significant othersw hat appropriate normative behavior entails (Haidt, 2001) .Furthermore,people tend to use significant others' opinions as a heuristicfor their own opinions(Iagree with the people Ilike) and behaviors(Iact like the people Ilike). Moreover,thinking of significant others is likely to activatethe norms, attitudes, opinions,and behaviorstheyare associated with (Chaiken, 1980; Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003) .Especially,the classic results from Baldwin, Carrel, &Lopez, 1990 seem to support the hypothesis that remindersofsignificant othersmay enhance the cognitive accessibilityofthe normative expectations, theyhold forus, and 'socialize' environments.For example, Baldwin et al. (1990) showed that students' evaluations of a an erotict extw erel ess positive after being primed with ap icture of their mother compared to being primed with ap icture of an unknown person. This supportst he notion that primingo ne'sm other increases the accessibilityo fm om'sn ormative expectations (e.g.'Thou shallnot readpornographic texts') and affects one'sbehavior accordingly.
Previous researchonthe norm-inducing power of thinking about significant others thus suggests that when people are primed with significant others,theyare morelikely to perceivea ne nvironment (e.g. library) in an orm-relevant manner (You should be silenthere) rather than an orm-irrelevant manner (This building was designed by Rem Koolhaas), because these others are strongly associated with normative expectations and proper behavior.I nf act, based on this previous researcho ne could argue that merely primingpeople with significant others(parents, partners, siblings) may,without any contextual cue, be sufficient to increase the perceived importance of norms in general (in additiont ot he specific,e nvironment-relevant norms). Thati s, given the intrinsic association betweenn ormative behavior and significant others (see e.g. Baldwin et al.,1990; Fitzsimons &Bargh, 2003; Joly&Stapel, 2008; Shah,2003) , merely priming significant others may increase the perceived importance of normative behavior in general.
To put our hypothesis that people primes may elicit norm-relevant interpretations of environments to ar obusta nd conservative test, we not only tested the impact of significant others(priminge.g. family,friends, parents) on normative judgments, but also investigated to what extent the morea bstract concepto fp eople (priming e.g. others, persons, all) would induce norm-relevant interpretations of an environment. We argue that the abstractc oncepto f' people' is likely to be aw eaker elicitor of normative cognitions than significant others. Probably,this conceptistoo vague to spontaneously inducen orm-relative thinking, and too general to increase the accessibility of specific social norms by itself. But when this conceptis'contextualized', that is combined with an environmentalc ue, it may becomes pecifica nd meaningful and thus inducec ontextrelevant normative thoughts. In other words, by itself, apicture of asupermarket will not increase the perceived importance of supermarket-relevant norms. Andb yi tself, the prime 'people' will not amplify normative thinking. But, 'people in asupermarket' may evoke environment-specific behaviors(e.g. shopping) and norms (e.g. paying forone's groceries). Thus,although priming 'people' may notaffect general normative judgments, it is likely to lead to norm-relevant interpretations of specifictarget environments.
This conjecture is supported by results from researchonobserver effectsindicating that reminders of people can evokenormative behavior when theyare perceived within aspecific context. For example, Munger and Harris(1989) showed that women using a restroom washed their handsm ore often if anotheru nknown person is present in the restroom than when being alone.S imilarly, Haleya nd Fessler (2005)s howed that participants playing adictator game are more generous when theyare primed with two Egyptian stylized eyes (observerprime) than whentheyare primed with the name of the laboratory.
Overview
We tested our hypothesis that the cognitive accessibility of the construct 'people' will elicit norm-relevant interpretations of environments in two studies. In Study 1, we primed participants with astrong and specific 'people' prime (significant others, such as mother,p artner,a nd friends). In Study 2, we primed participants with am ore global 'people' prime (generalized others such as people, others, them). In boths tudies,w e tested the hypothesis that to increase the perceived importance of environmentrelevant norms when people are exposed to as pecific environment, it is necessaryt o prime 'people.'W ealso explored the effects of relativelystrong (significant others)and weak (generalized others) people primes on the perceived importance of general, environment-unrelated norms.
STUDY1
In Study 1, we put our ideas to afi rstt est by primingp articipants with ap icture of a libraryand remindersofsignificant others. To prime significant others, we used words (e.g. parents, family members,t eachers, and friends) rather than pictureso fp eople's faces( see fore xample Baldwin et al.,1 990).T his excludes confounds between the impacto ff acial expressions versus the merei nfluence of the construct of significant others. Unlikep revious studies in which one specific significant other person was primed (e.g.B aldwin et al.,1 990; Fitzsimons &B argh, 2003; Shah,2 003), we used several significant othersa sp rimes because this is morel ikely to strongly activate the relevance of normative behavioringeneral. Whereas each significant other is likely to be associated with differentsocial norms, priming anumber of significant othersislikely to increase the perceived relevance of norms in general.
We tested the impactofthese manipulations on three measures of normimportance: the perceived importance of norms related to the specific environment to which we exposed the subjects (for example, in al ibrary, one should be silent);t he perceived importance of 'norms in general'; and the willingness to conformt ow ell-established norms (conformism). The hypothesis is that exposure to aspecificenvironment is more likely to raise the perceived importance of specific,environment-relevant norms when significant othersare accessible compared to when theyare not.Furthermore,because of the strong norm-inducing effectsofsignificant others,wealso test the hypothesis that priming significant othersw ill increase the perceived importance of more general norms and increase conformisminp articipants.
Method
Participants and design Fifty-six undergraduate students participated in this study forp artial course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a2(People: significant othersv s. control) £ 2( Environment: libraryv s. no library) between subjects design.
Procedure and materials
All participants receivedapaper-and-pencilq uestionnaire that supposedly tested language skills and personal opinions.First, theyc ompleted ascrambled sentence test (Srull &W yer, 1979 ) that consisted of 23 sentences. Participants werei nstructed to construct correct four-word sentencesout of fivewords that werepresented to them in ascrambled order (e.g. blue the is sky father)and to underline the word that hadtobe left out in order to make ag rammatically correct sentence. In the significant others conditions, the first and from there on everyt hird sentence, contained one of the manipulation words ( mother,f amily, colleagues, teacher,p arents, father,t eam members, roommates, and friends). In the control conditions, neutral words had to be underlined (e.g. wood, fork,and curtains).
Next, participants in the libraryconditionwere askedtocarefullystudy apicture of an emptyl ibraryf or half am inute. Participants in the no-library conditionc ontinued right away with the next task.
In thef ollowing task,w ea ssessedt he perceivedi mportanceo fs pecific, environment-relevant norms ( Ib elieve that it is important to be silent in al ibrary ) and general norms ( Ib elieve that norms and values arei mportant)b ya sking all participants to indicate their agreement with statements on 10-point Likerttype scales (1 ¼ do notagree at all, 10 ¼ agree completely).
Then, participants indicated their agreement with three statements that assessed conformism (I want to conformt ow ell established social norms, Ib elieve that it is important to conformt ow ell established social norms and Ia lways tryt oc onformt o well established social norms on 10-point Likertt ype scales (1 ¼ do not agree at all, 10 ¼ agree completely). These questions formed areliable scale (Cronbach's a ¼ .95). Finally, participants were askedtowrite down any ideas theymight have concerning the goal of the research. Theira nswerss howed that none of them werea ware of the purposeo ft he study.
Results and discussion
To test our hypotheses, we first performed amultivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA ) with People (significant othersvs. no significant others) and Environment (libraryvs. no library) as between subject factors on the perceived importance of libraryn orms, general norms, and conformism. This revealed as ignificant People xE nvironment interaction, F ð 3 ; 50Þ¼3 : 24, p , : 04, h 2 ¼ : 16, andamain effect of People, F ð 3 ; 50Þ¼9 : 56, p , : 01, h 2 ¼ : 37. Next, we performed univariate analyses on the dependent measures.
Libraryn orm
The univariate analyses on the norm'to be silentinthe library' revealed the predicted People £ Environment interaction, F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼6 : 13, p , : 02, h 2 ¼ : 11 and amain effect of Library F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼4 : 44, p , : 04, h 2 ¼ : 08.Other F s , 1. As the means and pairwise comparisons in Table 1s how,t he perceived importance of the libraryn ormw as relativelyhigh when participants wereprimed with alibrarypicture and with significant others( M ¼ 8 : 86).Int he other conditions, these norms cores were relativelyl ow: No significant others, no library( M ¼ 7 : 87), No significant others,l ibrary( M ¼ 7 : 77), Significant others, no library( M ¼ 7 : 64).
General norms
The univariate analyses on the general normss howed am ain effect of People, F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼26: 43, p , : 01, h 2 ¼ : 34 (Other F s , 1). As can be seen in Table 1 , general norms werer ated as more important when participants were primed with significant others( M ¼ 8 : 66) than when theyw ere not so primed ( M ¼ 7 : 10).
Conformism
The univariate analyses on the conformism measured also revealed am ain effect of people, F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼10: 14, p , : 01, h 2 ¼ : 16 (Other F s , 1). As can be seen in Table 1 , participants'w illingness to conformt on ormative expectations was higher when they were primed with significant others( M ¼ 8 : 27)t han when theyw ere not so primed ( M ¼ 7 : 10).
These results nicely supporto ur main hypothesis that mere exposure to as pecific environment is probably not enoughtoraise the perceived importance of environmentspecific norms. Specific environment-relevant norms aremorelikely to be salient when significant othersa re mentallyp resent.I nterestingly,o ur results also show that the cognitive accessibility of significant othersalone is sufficient to increase the perceived importance of more general norms and the tendency to conform. In our view,t his differential effect of our manipulation on general versus specific normjudgments makes sense whent aking into consideration the level of specificity of these dependent measures. The norm-inducing power of significant others may be toog eneral to affect specific situational norms such as 'In alibraryone should be silent.'The concepts white and horse may evoke all sortso fa ssociations with white (e.g. snow,t oothpaste) and horse (e.g. stable, saddle) when theyare perceived separately,but only when theya re presented in combination will theyactivatearepresentation of a white horse.Similarly, significant othersmay evoke ageneral normative mindset (seeAjzen &Fishbein, 1980), but only whentheyare mentally present in combination with aspecific environmental cue (a libraryp icture) are theyl ikely to raise situation-specific normative thinking.
STUDY2
In Study 1, by primingparticipants with apicture of alibraryand significant others, we demonstratedt hat environments are morel ikely to activate environment-specific normative thinking when perceivers' have people on their mind'. In the current experiment, we put the samehypothesis to amore conservative test. Whereas in Study 1 we primed people with apicture of alibraryand 'significant others', in the present study we primed participants with apicture of alibraryand the much more vague and abstract construct of 'people' (others, all, persons). If we are correct in claiming that environments are interpreted in as ocial, norm-relevant manner when perceivershave people on their mind, then simplyp riming' people' should be enought oe voke environment-relevant normative thinking. Primingt he more abstract constructs of others, all, and persons, we also make it less likely that the effectsofour people primes could be explained in terms of positive mood. Whereas priming significant otherssuch as 'friends' and 'family' may inducepositive feelings, it is less likely that primingabstract constructs such as 'others'a nd 'all' will do so, especially when these constructsa re hidden in ar elativelyb oring puzzle task (see Methods section).
As in Study 1, we also investigated the impacto fo ur primes on general normative judgments and the willingness to conformt on ormative expectations (conformism). Becauseo fi ts non-specific nature, 'people' primes should have aw eaker impact on general normative judgments than significant others( who are often associated with clear and specificn orms and expectations). One way to test whether or not 'having people on one'smind' really 'socializes'anenvironment is to include measures of public and private self-consciousness. When people think about environments in in social terms, their level of public self-consciousness(their public self) should be relativelyhigh and their levelofprivate self-consciousness should be relativelylow.Previous research has shown that whenpeople enter or are exposed to social environments,their private self-consciousnesst ypically goes down, their public self-consciousness typically goes up, and their behavior is driven more by social norms. Being as ocial person (being a person who is aware of his her social environment) does often mean definingoneself in terms of 'we' rather than in terms of 'I' (see Stapel &V an der Zee, 2006) and being publically self-aware (see Wiekens &S tapel, 2008) .
Method
Participants and design Seventy-eight undergraduate students participated in this study as acourse requirement. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a2(People: generalized othersv s. no generalized others) £ 2( Environment: libraryv s. no library) between subjects design.
Procedure and materials
Exceptf or the scrambled sentence task and the measuremento fp ublic and private consciousness, the procedure and materials of Study 2were identical to those of Study 1. The scrambled sentence task was designedtosubtly prime the construct of people in general. Thus,i nt he generalized other condition, the target words were: others, persons, group, people, everyone, everybody, together, all,and them.
Public and private consciousnessw ere measured directly after the social norms questions.W eu sed four items of the public consciousnesss cale (e.g. Ia mc oncerned aboutwhatother people think of me)and three of the private consciousnessscale (e.g. Ia mg enerally attentive to my inner feelings;F enigstein, Scheier,&Buss, 1975) . Participants werea sked to indicate their agreement with each of the statements on a scale ranging from 1( Id on ot agree at all) to 10 (I agree completely). In the present study,p ublic consciousnessp roved to be ar eliable subscale (Cronbach's a ¼ .70), and/while private consciousness provedtobeless reliable (Cronbach's a ¼ .58). Next, participants filledi nt he conformism questions (Cronbach's a ¼ .84).F inally, participants were asked to write down what theyb elieved to be the aim of the research. None of the participants was aware of the researchgoal.
Results and discussion
To test our hypotheses, we first performed aMANOVAwith People (generalized others vs. no generalized others) and Environment( libraryv s. no library) as between subject factors on the perceived importance of librarynorms, general norms, conformism, and consciousnessmeasures. The multivariate test revealed aPeople £ Libraryinteraction, 
Libraryn orm
The univariate analyses on the norm'to be silentinthe library' revealed amain effect of People, F ð 1 ; 74Þ¼4 : 21, p , : 05, h Table 2 show,t he perceived importance of the libraryn ormw as relativelyh igh when participants were primed with alibrarypicture and with generalized others(M ¼ 8 : 79). In the other conditions, these normscores were relatively low:Nog eneralized others, Ta ble 2. Mean ( SD)l ibraryn orm, general norm, conformism, public consciousness, and private consciousness scores as af unction of people (generalized others) and environment (library) Note.M eans are on as cale ranging from 1t o1 0w ith higher numbers indicating higher attributed norm importance,conformism, and consciousness. Means with different superscripts differ significantly (at least p , : 05).
no library(M ¼ 7 : 70), No generalized others, library(M ¼ 7 : 85),Generalized others,no library( M ¼ 7 : 74).
Normsing eneral
The univariate analyses on general norms scores revealed asignificant People £ Library interaction, F ð 1 ; 74Þ¼4 : 41, p , : 04, h 2 ¼ : 06 andamaine ffecto fL ibrary F ð 1 ; 74Þ¼7 : 78, p , : 01, h 2 ¼ : 1(other F , 1). As Table 2shows , general normscores were relativelyh igh whenp articipants were primed with al ibraryp icture and with generalized others ( M ¼ 8 : 42). In the other conditions, these norms cores were relativelyl ow:N og eneralized others, no library( M ¼ 7 : 30), No generalized others, library( M ¼ 7 : 50),Generalized others, no library( M ¼ 7 : 00).
Conformism
The univariate analyses on the conformismm easures revealed aP eople £ Library interaction, F ð 1 ; 74Þ¼5 : 61, p , : 03, h Table 2s hows, public consciousness scoresw ere relativelyh igh when participants were primed with al ibraryp icture and with generalized others ( M ¼ 8 : 74). In the other conditions, these norm scores were relativelyl ow:N o generalized others, no library( M ¼ 7 : 74), No generalized others, library( M ¼ 7 : 85), Generalized others, no library( M ¼ 7 : 65).T his result provides the first empirical evidence that public consciousnessi sr aised whenp eople are exposed to an environment with apeople focus.This makes people self-aware in away that is similar to more traditional mirror,c amera, or television circuit manipulations that areu sually used in self-awareness research( see fore xample, Beaman, Klentz, Diener,&Svanum, 1979; Carver, 1975; Diener &W allblom,1 976; Macrae, Bodenhausen,&Milne, 1998; Wiekens &S tapel, 2008) .
Private consciousness
The univariate analyses on the public consciousnesss cale revealed am arginally significant People effect, F ð 1 ; 74Þ¼3 : 63, p ¼ : 06, h 2 ¼ : 05 (other F s , 1). Although the interaction did not researchs ignificance, the patterno fm eans (suggests Table 2 ) clearly suggests that private consciousness scores wererelatively lowwhen participants were primed with alibrarypicture and with generalized others(M ¼ 7 : 00). In the other conditions, these norms cores were relativelyh igh: No generalized others, no library ( M ¼ 7 : 95), No generalized others, library( M ¼ 7 : 95),G eneralized others,n ol ibrary ( M ¼ 7 : 88) (see Table2 ). Thisr esults hows the mirror imageo ft he public consciousnesseffects: private consciousness is lowered when people areexposed to an environmentalwith ap eople focus.
These results providefurther support forour main hypothesis that mere exposure to as pecifice nvironment is typicallyn ot enought or aise the perceived importance of environment-specific norms. The perceived importance of specific, environmentrelevant norms is more likely to increase whent he concepto fg eneralized others (people, persons, all) are cognitivelya ccessible. Thus,n ot only significant others( see Study 1), but also people in general can 'socialize' environments and thus makenorms more relevant. Interestingly,i nt his study,t his interaction effect (increased normative thinking when participants were exposed to both environment and generalized people primes) occurred also on the general norm, conformism measures and the public and private consciousnessmeasures. Thissuggests that when by themselves, norm-relevant 'environments' as well as the construct of 'people' are not strong enought oe voke normative thinking. When presented together,t hat is when one is exposed to a 'socialized' environment, then (both specific and general) normative cognitions become relativelys alient.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Social norms are valued cultural products that regulate social interactions and guide how needs and goals can be pursued in an appropriate manner (Lindenberg, 1994; Sherif,1 936/1965) . It is therefore important to know more about whatt he preconditions are fors ocial norms to comei nto action. Previous researchh as shown that norms are more likely to predict behavior whentheyare accessible (Cialdini, Reno, &Kallgren, 1990) and relevant forimmediate behavior (Aarts &Dijksterhuis, 2003) .The accessibility of social norms can be raised with lexical primingtechniques using normrelated words (e.g. Epley&Gilovich, 1999) and by perceiving other people'sbehavior (see e.g. Cialdini et al.,1990; Latane &D arley, 1970; Sherif, 1936 Sherif, /1965 . Up until now, there has been only little researcho nt he normative effects of environments (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003) and on the normative effects of people primes (e.g. Baldwin et al., 1990; Munger &H arris, 1989) . And, to the besto fo ur knowledge,t here has been no researchy et that explicitly and systematically tested the hypothesis that environmentrelevant normative thinking will be elicited mainly whenpeople perceiveenvironments in asocial manner,that is with 'people on their mind.'Inthis article, we presented two studies that supported this hypothesis. We demonstrated that by itselfanenvironmental cue (picture of an empty library) is insufficient to raise the perceived importance of environment-relevant norms( be silent in thel ibrary). Environments do not spontaneously or automatically elicit relevant normative thinking. However,w hen environments are perceived and interpretedw ith a' people-focus,'t he perceived importance of environment-relevant norms increases considerably.That is the main and most important finding of these studies.F urthermore, our results suggest that when significant othersa re salient, the normative effect is relativelys trong.T he normative impactofthe (vaguerand more global) conceptof'people in general' is weaker.Future researchm ay want to delve into this phenomenon more deeply.
The studies reported here could be placed in the relativelym odernt radition of 'behavioral priming' research, which shows that people'sjudgments and actions can be affected relativelyeasily by making behavior-relevant constructs cognitivelyaccessible.
Or,toput it differently, thinking about Xissometimes enoughto act X. Thus, behavioral priming studies have shown that thinking about 'rudeness' makes people actimpolitely, thinking about 'intelligence' makes them smarter,and thinking about how your muscles worka ctually makes you physicallys tronger (e.g. Dijksterhuis et al.,1 998; Marchant, Clough, Crawshaw, &L evy,i np ress; S tapel &B lanton, 2004) . What differentiates the present studiesfrom these behavioral primingstudies is that our researchsuggests that there may be some boundary conditions to direct priminge ffects: When it concerns normative behavior,s imple environmentalc ues or environment-relevant constructs (e.g. ap icture of al ibrary) are in themselves nots ufficient to automatically elicit the relevant mode of thinking. Only when such cues are' socialized' or 'humanized' will theyl ead to normative effects. Future studies may want to investigate whether similar boundary conditionse xist foro ther types of 'direct' priminge ffects (for as imilar perspective on this issue,see Stapel &B lanton, 2004) .
In the present studies,w eu sed ap aradigm similar to that reported by Aarts and Dijksterhuis (2003) ,w ho showed that al ocation can prime as ituational normi f perceiversintend to visit it. We extend the Aarts-Dijksterhuis findings by showing that even when people have no intention to go somewhere, this environment may prime (situational as well as non-situational) norms-given that this environment is socialized by means of an inhanced accessibility of people.O ne-way to interpret these results is that as long as people are, or feel theya re,n ot alone in ag iven environment, theya re more likely to conformt os ocial norms. When people have a' people focus,'t heya re more likely to think and act normatively -e venw hen theya re physically alone. Of course, this is a ceteris paribus finding: Whether people indeedc onformt on orms in less controlled situations than the ones we used to test our hypotheses ultimately depends on many other factorsaswell, such as the costs of complying with or deviating from the norms.
Results from researchbyKay,Wheeler,Bargh, and Ross (2004) might be interpreted as contradicting the present findings. Kay et al. (2004) showed that objects that are characteristic forabusinesscontext(e.g.abriefcase, fountain pen) prime stereotypical businessc onstructs (such as 'competitive') and can increase competitive behavior. Although it may appear as if the Kay et al. (2004) effects could be obtained without inducing apeople-focus, we would argue that the objectstheyused may in fact be seen as acombination of situational cues and people cues as theynot only suggest abusiness context, but theymay also prime people and behaviors associated with this context or object.F or example, ab riefcase is likely to be associated with ab usinessc ontext, but also with the managercarrying it around.
In conclusion then, we have argued and demonstrated that social norms are essentiallya bout 'people'a nd that therefore reminderso fp eople socialize environments in the sense that theyc hangep hysical locations into social contexts wheres ocial norms matter.W hen we think of other people while 'perceiving' an environment, social norms begin to matter more; that is how being therew ith others makesenvironment norm-relevant.
